Syracuse University

SURFACE
Economics - Faculty Scholarship

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs

3-2002

Cost-Benefit Analysis: Why Relative Economic Position Does Not
Matter
Thomas J. Kniesner
Syracuse University and Institute for the Study of Labor

W. Kip Viscusi
Vanderbilt University and National Bureau of Economic Research

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Kniesner, Thomas J. and Viscusi, W. Kip, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: Why Relative Economic Position Does
Not Matter" (2002). Economics - Faculty Scholarship. 127.
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/127

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
Working Paper No. 02-5

Harvard Law School
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business
Discussion Paper No. 358

Cost-Benefit Analysis: Why Relative Economic
Position Does Not Matter

Thomas J. Kniesner and W. Kip Viscusi

April 2002

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=305180

JEL Class: K3, J17, H5

A Cost-Benefit Analysis: Why Relative Economic Position
Does Not Matter
Thomas J. Kniesner*
and
W. Kip Viscusi**
Abstract
The current debate over cost-benefit concerns in agencies’ evaluations of
government regulations is not so much whether to consider costs and benefits at all but
rather what belongs in the estimated costs and benefits themselves. Overlaid is the longstanding concern that the distribution of costs and benefits needs some consideration in
policy evaluations. In a recent article in the University of Chicago Law Review, Robert
Frank and Cass Sunstein proposed a relatively simple method for adding distributional
concerns to policy evaluation that enlarges the typically constructed estimates of the
individual’s willingness to pay for safer jobs or safer products. We show that when
considering the core of the Frank and Sunstein proposal carefully one concludes that
current regulatory evaluations should be left alone because there is no reason to believe
that relative positional effects are important either to personal decisions in general or to
currently constructed cost-benefit calculations of government regulations in particular.
We argue that the most important refinements one could make in the area of regulatory
evaluation would be for agencies involved to adhere more to the framework of what is
generally considered a carefully done cost-benefit study, and for agencies to make greater
actual use of appropriately done cost-benefit studies when recommending regulations.
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An exciting recent development in cost-benefit evaluation of policy is the
issuance of so-called prompt letters by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget (Hahn and Sunstein 2001). OIRA’s
prompt letters, which are made public, have openly encouraged agencies such as the
Food and Drug Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to
explore specifically named regulations that OIRA believes may be cost beneficial, such
as possibly requiring automatic external defibrillators in the workplace. Whether prompt
letters and other efforts to reform the regulatory process will be successful depends
ultimately on how one values the benefits and costs of the regulations. Frank and
Sunstein (2001) propose that benefit estimates used to value lives in regulatory studies,
such as the ones OIRA seeks to promulgate, be increased. Their rationale for enlarging
benefit calculations is that, as currently constructed, benefit estimates do not account for
the role of people’s concern over relative economic position in society. We argue against
replacing the current approach to valuing risks to life and health because there is little
evidence that relative position is important to individual decisions and even if it were
policy decisions involving cost-benefit calculations would not change.
In the absence of explicit legislative prohibition, a comparison of costs to
outcomes coupled with economic balancing is now the default standard when formulating
a new government regulation (Sunstein 2000). Cost-outcome balancing means weighing
the policy’s benefits and costs. Although studies of programs’ costs and outcomes have
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been deservedly criticized for lack of completeness, Executive Order 12866 makes
agencies provide a regulatory impact evaluation if a rule or regulation may “have an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material
way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or
communities.” (Hahn et al. 2000). Similar intent that costs and outcomes be considered
explicitly appears in the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995. In what may have a
dampening effect on cost and benefit comparisons in decision making, at least in the
private sector, juries seem to punish private sector firms that try to balance costs and
benefits of harm to customer or worker health when making production decisions prior to
accidents and ultimate tort suits (Viscusi 2001). Still, where government regulations are
concerned, no longer is the debate mostly over whether to consider costs and benefits but
rather more over what belongs in the cost and benefit columns.1
Frank and Sunstein offer a simple solution to the thorny issue of how to
incorporate non-uniform net benefits across initially advantaged versus disadvantaged
groups when calculating net benefits of a regulation. We argue that there are conceptual
and practical flaws to the modest proposal of Frank and Sunstein so that producers and
users of studies of regulatory cost and outcomes should not adopt their idea. Rather, we
should retain the current approach of using absolute benefit values rather than benefit
values adjusted for relative economic position.

1

For a brief and readable discussion see Kniesner 1997.
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Current Practice
As currently practiced, analysis of the benefits of risk reduction typically relies on
multivariate statistical estimates of what a worker is implicitly willing to accept to incur
risks on the jot or what a consumer is implicitly willing to pay for a safer product.
Estimates of such risk-money tradeoffs underlie the estimated benefits of saving a
statistical life, known either as the implicit value of life or the value of a statistical life.
These concerns also underlie the estimated benefits of preventing certain non-fatal
injuries, sometimes referred to as the implicit value of harm. Government regulations
mandating greater safety will lower wages and raise product prices so that the ultimate
costs of the safety enhancements are paid for by the end users of the safety, workers and
consumers. The change in wages or prices then reveals the value of a regulation-induced
safety enhancement to compare to cost calculations in a cost-benefit analysis.
The standard procedure, then, used to calculate benefit values for a government
program is the amount society is willing to pay for the program’s benefits. In the case of
risk regulation the reference point is our willingness to pay for the risk reduction that was
achieved by the regulation. In the case of policies that save lives the question is not how
much people are willing to pay for the particular outcomes in terms of actual lives saved,
but how much people are willing to pay for reductions in the risk to life for a much
broader population group.
To establish meaningful values for the tradeoffs people are willing to make
between risk and money, economists have focused on choices people make in the
marketplace. A chief source of information has been estimates from the labor market.
Using large data sets on worker behavior, one can estimate the incremental wages
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workers receive in return for facing added risk, controlling for other aspects of the
worker’s job. The wage increment approach yields an implicit value of life in the range of
$3 million to $7 million for most studies in the literature.2 For the sake of convenience,
we will take a midpoint value of about $5 million as indicating an appropriate value of a
statistical life based on market wage-risk tradeoffs. So, if workers faced an annual job
fatality risk of one chance in 10,000, an implicit value of life of $5 million implies that
each worker would require an extra $500 to face the added 1/10,000 risk of death. Put
somewhat differently, if there were 10,000 workers affected, each of whom faced a job
risk of one chance in 10,000, then there would be one expected statistical death to the
group. In return for facing the 1/10,000 risk there would be an extra wage premium of
$500 for each of the 10,000 workers, or a total of $5 million more paid in wages.
Implicitly, the group of workers are willing to exchange total compensation of $5 million
to accept the extra risk of one statistical death to their group, which gives rise to the value
of a statistical life of $5 million. We will refer to estimates of extra group compensation
as absolute value of life figures.
Practitioners of cost-benefit analysis have assembled several panels of experts to
make recommendations for what a well-formulated cost-benefit comparison should
contain in the areas of the environment, health, and medicine with the goal of increasing
realism and transparency of calculations and decisions to be drawn (Gold et al. 1996;
Arrow et al. 1996). A common concern for cost-benefit analysis is that distribution of
costs and benefits by, say, income or race should not be ignored when reporting and
applying cost-benefit analysis. If two policies have the same total costs and total benefits
one might argue on equity grounds that the policy that does more for the poor should be
2

For a review of the evidence, see Viscusi 1998, especially Table 4.2.
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preferred. However, addressing issues of distribution more generally are controversial
and can be used carelessly or strategically (Viscusi 2000b).
A stumbling block in applying adjustments for distributional considerations has
been how to do it in practice while maintaining the well-known objective of KISS (Keep
It Sophisticatedly Simple). Frank and Sunstein present a clearly argued KISS-based
proposal for incorporating income distribution consequences of health and safety
regulations into ultimate decisions based on policy analyses. We contend that conceptual
and practical flaws that we will identify should make practitioners of cost-benefit analysis
justifiably unmoved by the refinements offered by Frank and Sunstein.
The Frank and Sunstein Refinement to Policy Evaluation Current Practice
Frank and Sunstein (2001) propose that economists, lawyers, and policymakers
not use typical absolute value of life figures but instead use value of life figures that
consider persons’ relative economic positions. Frank and Sunstein contend that people
are on “a positional treadmill” in which they accept extra pay for job risks in an effort to
achieve relative economic (income/consumption) status. In their view the standard
estimates used in the federal government of a value of life of about $4 million should be
increased. Their stated rationale for boosting estimated values of life is as follows:
The essential reason for our claim is that people care a great deal about their
relative economic position, and not solely, and often not mostly, about their
absolute economic position. Current estimates tell us what an individual, acting in
isolation, would be willing to pay for, say, an increase in safety on the job. But
when an individual buys additional safety in isolation, he experiences not only an
absolute decline in the amounts of other goods and services he can buy, but also a
decline in his relative living standards. In contrast, when a regulation requires all
workers to purchase additional safety, each worker gives up the same amount of
other goods, so no worker experiences a decline in relative living standards. If
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relative living standards matter, then an individual will value an across-the-board
increase in safety more highly than an increase in safety that he alone purchases.3
Frank and Sunstein maintain that a worker’s concern over relative economic
position means that, as currently calculated, market wage-risk tradeoffs understate the
implicit value of life. So, if the government now uses $4 million as the average value of
life, in their view additional concerns over workers’ relative positions should increase the
appropriate amount to a range from $4.7 million to $7 million.4 For the $5 million
reference point that we indicate above, the value-of-life range would be from $5.9 million
to $8.8 million. Thus, the main effect of their procedure would be to boost the estimated
average value of life used in benefit assessment by 18% to75% over what is currently
used.
The main, and surely controversial, innovation to cost-benefit analysis argued for
by Frank and Sunstein is a contention that persons care not only about the other things
they can buy besides safety, but also about how their consumption of other things or
income compares to the income and consumption of others in society. Frank and Sunstein
believe that not only does my personal sense of well-being depend on my own income
but that it also depends on where I am located in the income pecking order of whatever
demographic barnyard I think I belong to emotionally. In Frank and Sunstein’s view of
regulatory evaluation, greater mandated safety has attached to it the additional cost of
moving down the income distribution, and conventional estimates of willingness to pay
incorporate the individual’s cost of having more safety from being made worse off in a
relative residual income sense.

3
4

See Frank and Sunstein at p. 326; accompanying footnote omitted.
See Frank and Sunstein at p. 323.
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Frank and Sunstein conclude that conventional cost-benefit analysis undervalues
health and safety regulation because the benefits are understated. Because a regulation
makes everyone in the relevant group consume more safety and suffer similar wage
reductions and price increases, there is no change in anyone’s relative economic position
from a widespread regulation. According to Frank and Sunstein, conventional benefit
calculations that use risk-money tradeoff estimates are too low, and in turn cost-benefit
analysis calculations too economically pessimistic about society’s gain from the
regulation, because conventional estimates of the value of life are individualistic and net
out the person’s private loss from moving down the income distribution. Their bottom
line is to argue that conventionally calculated value of life estimates should be increased
when deciding whether to adopt a regulation that would save statistical lives. The obvious
practical consequence of what Frank and Sunstein contend is that some regulations that
are currently viewed as not worthwhile may be considered cost effective.
Conceptual Issues and Contradictory Evidence
In many cases the devil is in the details. Here the devil is in what Frank and
Sunstein leave out of the details. The standard economic approach to understanding a
person’s or a firm’s decisions is symmetric in the sense that price is compared to the
economic value of a good or service. Frank and Sunstein want an asymmetry where there
is a second cost of safety if one buys it in isolation, which is less purchasing power for
other things than before compared to the others in a person’s reference group. Residual
income has a so-called positional effect in that the person implicitly buying the safety
would also pay an additional amount not to have an associated decline in relative
command over other things such as clothing or pleasure travel. The amount one would
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pay to avoid moving down the consumption ladder would then be added into any social
calculation of the benefits of a safety-enhancing regulation that is applied universally.
Consumption can surely be a status symbol, and Frank and Sunstein are correct in
suggesting that higher income confers greater economic status. However, there are other
attributes associated with a job that may be consequential as well. Perhaps most pertinent
here is that being in good health is a highly valued attribute. People may simply have a
preference for safer jobs because safe jobs protect individual health.
We find the Frank and Sunstein willingness to make residual income (non-safety
consumption) positional in isolation somewhat odd. If I care about my relative income
should I also not care about my relative health and safety?5 Frank and Sunstein argue that
workers know their relative income position but do not know their relative safety position
at work (p. 351). At the risk of sounding like the cartoon sociologist to whom two
anecdotes are a large data set and one anecdote is a small data set, a brief story is in
order. One of us once worked during the summer in a chemical plant. Everyone in the
plant knew that working in the acid production department was much more dangerous
than working in the sodium production department. Most butchers we have met have part
of at least one finger missing and most roofers we have met have a broken back of
varying degrees of severity. One need not have the same reference group for safety as for
residual consumption either.6 Workers do know their relative workplace safety, so it is
difficult to accept safety in the workplace as a totally non-positional good.
We contend that if income remaining after one implicitly purchases more safety
or health affects the feeling of well-being indirectly via the relative ability to purchase

5
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For additional theoretical discussion of offsetting positional effects see Besharov 2001.
For additional theoretical discussion of multiple reference groups also see Besharov 2001.
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fewer other things, then a regulation also makes one better off because the additional
safety or health is not only absolute but also relative to a reference group. Safety or health
may also be positional so that I get additional well-being from being safer than my
neighbors or colleagues. If it seems reasonable for one to care about how his or her
consumption of non-safety things compares to the consumption of others, then it also
seems reasonable that one should care about how his or her consumption of safety and
health compares to others’ safety and health. The two positional effects may then simply
cancel. The supplemental welfare effect of moving up the safety ladder can cancel the
supplemental welfare effect of moving down the consumption of all other things ladder,
and we are back to the familiar case where only the absolute levels of safety and residual
income come into play.
One source of evidence regarding countervailing positional effects where health is
concerned is revealed by the relationship between income and the desire for health
insurance. As people get richer, do they have greater desire to purchase health insurance
to protect their health? The evidence here is quite strong. Economic estimates suggest
that as one’s income increases by some percentage, the demand for health insurance also
increases but at roughly half that rate.7 The observed relationship between income and the
desire to protect one’s health suggests to us that workers are concerned not only with
their income position but also with their health position in society.
An even more direct piece of evidence on countervailing health positional
considerations pertains to how people’s attitudes toward bearing risks on the job vary
with their income level. Consider the following evidence on chemical workers attitude
toward facing greater risks of job injury. For chemical workers the main matter of interest
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is not the implicit value of life but rather the implicit value of a job injury as reflected in
the tradeoff workers are willing to make between higher pay and greater risks of injury
from the job. Evidence for chemical workers indicates that the implicit value of a job
injury increases quite strongly with one’s income. Thus, a 10% increase in income would
boost the value attached to avoiding a job injury from 6.7% to 11%.8 A higher income
enables one to avoid the risky jobs, which quite simply are not that attractive, and means
that people seem to show a willingness to tradeoff income position again an improved
health position.
The undesirability of hazardous work is also reflected in who takes such jobs. Are
the most dangerous jobs in the firm the most sought after positions that workers compete
for in an effort to boost their economic status relative to their peers? That dangerous jobs
are sought after because they allow relatively high consumption of goods and services is
the story line that would offer much support for the Frank and Sunstein perspective that
workers try to boost their economic status through hazardous work. In practice, what we
observe is opposite the basic Frank and Sunstein proposition. Risky jobs tend to be
staffed in large part by new hires who tend to have very little job experience.9 Indeed, as
many as one-third of all manufacturing quits may be due to the influence of job hazards
on worker quitting.10 Rather than workers seeking out risky positions, new workers fill
hazardous jobs that tend to be primarily entry level and are jobs that workers quit quickly
so as to avoid facing the attendant health risks. The rapid flight of workers from the risky
entry level jobs is consistent with our empirical observation that hazardous jobs tend to
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See, for example, Newhouse and Phelps 1976.
This evidence is based on the evidence on page 369 of Viscusi and Evans 1990.
9
See Viscusi 1979.
10
Ibid. See also Viscusi 1983.
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be among the least attractive positions in any enterprise. They also tend to be smelly,
dirty, and undesirable jobs in other respects as well. Risky jobs are not the treasured
targets of opportunity for upward mobility that Frank and Sunstein envision.
To be fair, Frank and Sunstein mention the possibility of safety and health being
positional goods too, although they claim the positionality of health and safety is less
than the positionality of residual income (p. 351). Frank and Sunstein also consider
implications of a situation where safety or health is partly positional, but not as positional
as residual consumption.11 In particular, Frank and Sunstein consider the situation where
the positional effect of residual consumption is half offset by the positional impact of
safety (p. 355). Does it matter whether safety and health are partly versus totally nonpositional to the practice and use of cost-benefit analysis? Does the core of their
argument affect what is “good enough for government work?” Soon we will demonstrate
that “where the rubber hits the road” in the practice of cost-benefit analysis, nothing will
change because of the refinements Frank and Sunstein propose.
Finally, although Frank and Sunstein mention the phenomenon of loss aversion,
they do not explore fully how it weakens the argument for a possible role of relative
position effects in benefit assessment.12 To elaborate, loss aversion can alter how we
view the role of job risks. If people are in reality quite averse to incurring substantial
losses in income, then it will have tremendous consequences for the attractiveness of
hazardous jobs. If one is maimed or killed on the job, either the worker or the worker’s
survivors will experience a substantial drop in income. Because hazardous jobs are
intrinsically linked to the prospect of substantial losses, it is unclear that a worker will
11

For more analysis of the size of positional (externality) effects see Besharov 2001.
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gain relative social status through work on dangerous-high wage jobs. The key aspect is
that a job is a bundled commodity that includes income consequences, adverse health
consequences, and potentially unattractive non-pecuniary losses. Given an undesirable
mix of attributes along with the higher wage premium for the job, will working on a
dangerous job in fact confer the kind of social climbing effects that Frank and Sunstein
envision?
Evidence of Relative Position’s Importance?
Getting a handle on how people value their relative position with respect to others
is a difficult empirical task. There is much multivariate statistical evidence that people’s
economic behavior depends little on peer or reference group behavior (Moffitt 2001,
Brock and Durlauf 2001). Frank and Sunstein present a variety of suggestive evidence,
but the character of their evidence tends to be less compelling than that for market values
of wage-risk tradeoffs. It is also less concrete than our contradictory evidence presented
above, which is based on actual market behavior rather than thought experiments and
general surveys of people’s happiness.
One type of evidence they present pertains to various types of thought
experiments. For example, would you rather live in World A where you earned $110,000
per year while others earned $200,000, or would you rather live in World B where you
earned $100,000 per year while others earned $85,000? The subjects in their positional
income thought experiment are also told that the income figures represent real purchasing
power. About half their experimental subjects, which include University of Chicago Law
School students, say that they would prefer the World B situation with higher relative
12

See page 340 of Frank and Sunstein as they discuss loss aversion with respect to how people must pay

13

income. Frank and Sunstein interpret the slight majority favoring World B as evidence of
the importance of relative position. An even more plausible interpretation of the subjects’
conjectures is that experimental situations premised on an economic falsehood will not be
taken at face value by respondents. People will realize that in World A, where they earn
just under half of what everybody earns, the prices of goods and services will be bid up
and they will be less well off than if their earnings are greater than everyone else’s.
Including the disclaimer that income figures represent real purchasing power does not
overcome the underlying difficulty that the disclaimer is an economic falsehood. The
equal purchasing power disclaimer will not be fully credible to experimental student
subjects who realize the importance of their income within the context of the income of
other people in giving them access to goods and services in our economy.
A second kind of evidence Frank and Sunstein muster pertains to happiness
surveys. Researchers have found that when you ask people whether they are “very
happy,” “fairly happy,” or “not happy” their answers are strongly correlated with their
relative income within the country.13 How should one answer a categorical happiness
question when it is posed? One cannot resort to a thermometer or a weight scale to
obtain an objective reading. Categorical happiness questions are by their nature answered
within their social context. The same kinds of research as discussed by Frank and
Sunstein indicate that the distribution of responses to categorical happiness questions
tends to be unaffected by changes in overall levels of income over time. The phenomenon
of no income-level effect is also consistent with the relative character of the question. If
one asked a person in the late 1800s to assess personal happiness, the person might have

for regulation.
13
See pages 337–338 of Frank and Sunstein.
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indicated that he or she is very happy if there is a good functioning well and an outhouse
in close proximity. However, having the two amenities from the year 1800 today would
probably not make one feel “very happy.”
In much the same way, studies regarding what budget is needed to obtain some
minimum comfort level or “to get along in this community” are also likely to be
influenced by the current standard of living.14 People’s life expectancy was less 50 or 100
years ago, and many of the products we now purchase on a mass scale, such as a
telephone or a television, were formerly restricted to a narrow band of relatively wealthy
consumers. What we need “to get along in this community” necessarily changes with the
community’s standard of living. Relative questions will necessarily generate relative
answers, but they do not bolster the Frank and Sunstein core proposition. Answers to
questions about relative income or consumption simply do not constitute a valid test of
the importance of relative positional effects in willingness to pay calculations.
The linchpin of the Frank and Sunstein insights on policy evaluation of workplace
safety regulation is that workers seek a positional status benefit by accepting dangerous
jobs, which confer higher income. How much higher income? Suppose we use as a
starting point a value of life estimate of $5 million, which exceeds the $4 million figure
Frank and Sunstein use as their baseline. The average worker in the U.S. economy faces
an annual death risk on the order of one chance in 20,000.15 With a value of life of $5
million and a risk of one chance in 20,000, the average worker exposed to such a risk will
receive supplemental annual compensation of 1/20,000 × $5 million = $250 a year, which
is roughly $5 extra gross earnings per week. Working on a dangerous job may enable you
14
15
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See page 46 of the National Safety Council 2000.
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to buy an extra value meal every week at McDonalds but will not buy a Rolex watch, a
BMW, or any of the other status symbols that one can flaunt to demonstrate one’s higher
economic status. The point is that one does not buy much extra relative consumption for
accepting a job that is two or three times more dangerous than the average job.
Finally, the Frank and Sunstein maintained proposition, that positional effects are
important to evaluating willingness to pay and attendant regulatory benefits, is flawed
with respect to their attribution of the relevant reference group. As is indicated by the
quote above, Frank and Sunstein believe that if all workers are required to purchase
additional safety, then there will not be a positional effect. Only when an individual
worker must have greater job safety is relative position consequential, so that regulatory
policies will supposedly not be subject to the positional evaluation bias that affects
market tradeoffs. However, safety policies in the United States are not financed by
general revenues in which costs are spread across the entire society. If there is a
government regulation of, for example, the risks of explosion in a grain elevator, then the
regulation will boost the costs to the firm and will be borne, at least in part, by other
workers at the firm because the regulation can raise the price of the product and reduce
sales and the firm’s subsequent demand for workers. The neighbors of the grain elevator
workers who perhaps work for a construction firm or the highway department will not be
affected by the costs of the grain elevator safety regulation. Only the grain elevator’s
workers will incur the major share of the regulatory costs. In the case of the typical
regulation just described there will still be the economic status effects that concern Frank
and Sunstein. Only when everybody in society shares in a regulation’s cost will there be
no positional reshuffling. How a regulation’s cost must be shared for there not to be a

16

positional effect is unclear. We do not know whether it is the absolute cost amount that
should be equalized across people or whether it should be a proportional effect on their
income, or some other formula in order to ensure positional neutrality.16
It Will Not Matter Anyway
Let us come at the issue of positionality in cost-benefit analysis from the
perspective of persons outside the Ivory Tower who use and defend cost-effectiveness
calculations. Frank and Sunstein contend that income position matters in addition to
income level where individual well-being is calculated and then linked to safety. They
suggest a 50 per cent add factor on the value of life estimates currently in play. A second
anecdote is in order. One of us spent a year in the private sector doing cost-effectiveness
studies in a major drug company where there is much financial incentive to discover
defensible arguments for increasing the benefits of a health enhancing pharmacotherapy.
Even in an environment as profit-oriented as a drug company it would be impossible to
use made-up examples of Smith and Jones (pp. 348–351) and introspection (pp. 352–353)
to convince senior managers that the company could justify increasing the benefit of the
intervention by half. No one on the cost-benefit analysis firing line is going to cite
thought experiments or a comparison of pay and performance in three selected
occupations (pp. 361–363) as justification for changing benefit calculations as typically
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An additional complexity is that the individual’s reference group cannot be uniquely identified in
econometric models of individual outcomes (Manski 1993, Moffitt 2001). The reason is that possible
reference groups are nested inside each other. Suppose that we consider the effects of others’ incomes on
my behavior and that my true reference group is only my neighbor living in the house to the east. The
researcher cannot know that only the income of one neighbor enters my decisions, so that a statistical
model incorrectly attributing my reference group as all the houses on my block will find that the average
income on my block is statistically significant to my behavior because incomes are positively correlated
across houses nearby.
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done. Multivariate statistical evidence of the extent of any positional effects in income
will be needed.
The only study of even tangential relevance available on possible welfare effects
of relative income position is a Dutch study by van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer
(1985) that Frank and Sunstein discuss (pp. 353–355). Without commenting on the
quality of the statistical model or the generalizability of the results, let us simply note that
Frank and Sunstein interpret the results of the Dutch data as indicating that a 33 percent
increase in willingness to pay is implied because a person would feel indifferent between
the current situation and one in which he or she got a 33 percent increase in income while
everyone else of importance to the individual got a 100 percent increase in income. The
implication is that someone who would pay $1.00 for additional safety when consuming
it alone via a $1 higher product price or $1 lower wage would also pay $1.33 if everyone
else were regulated to consume the extra safety so that there is no relative decline in
one’s residual consumption. If safety is partly, but not totally positional too, then the add
factor is perhaps half of the 33 percent or 17 percent. In our judgment the best estimate
Frank and Sunstein could offer is to increase values attached to the benefits of risk
reduction by 17 to 33 percent in currently calculated cost-benefit analyses. It does not
matter for evaluating a regulation’s cost effectiveness whether one increases regulatory
benefits, as usually computed, by 17, 33, or even 50 percent. Bumping up the benefits by
the amounts suggested by Frank and Sunstein will not change how benefit estimates enter
currently conducted regulatory evaluations.
Users of statistical results concerning human behavior usually consider not only
the estimated average outcome but also a range of possible outcomes based on theoretical
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considerations or on the expected precision of the estimated average outcome (Krantz
1999). Incorporating the statistical accuracy of an estimate means that policy evaluations
regularly consider a range of outcomes rather than just the best single estimate of the
outcome. An obvious way to create a range of benefits for a regulation, for example, is to
create a pessimistic outcome that is the estimated average benefit of the regulation minus
2 or 3 times the measured imprecision in the estimated average benefit (standard error)
and an optimistic outcome that is the estimated average benefit plus 2 or 3 times the
measure of imprecision in the average.17
Now suppose we consider a well-known estimate of the value of a statistical life
as it applies to job safety and its associated measure of imprecision (Thaler and Rosen
1975) to form a pessimistic-optimistic interval for the value of life, as is currently typical
when doing cost-benefit analysis. Using Thaler and Rosen’s four basic sets of results we
find an implied willingness to pay for workplace safety range that is the average minus
80–240 percent and the average plus 80–240 percent. Note that the smallest optimistic
outcome for willingness to pay that a policy analyst would routinely consider when
applying Thaler and Rosen’s estimate is the average plus 80 percent, which is a 2.4 times
greater adjustment than the Frank and Sunstein back-of-the envelope calculation of how
current practice supposedly underestimates the value of life by ignoring distributional
issues (33 percent). Even if the estimated average value of life is, say, five times as large
as its standard error, a policy analyst would typically consider the average plus 60
percent, which is almost double the add factor Frank and Sunstein offer. The point is that
current practice already allows for imprecision of the average value of life estimate that is
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For discussion of the related, but not identical, issue of how to allow for uncertainty in estimation of costbenefit ratios see Manning, Fryback, and Weinstein 1996.
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much larger than the amount of imprecision in willingness to pay that Frank and Sunstein
claim to have identified.18 (However, Hahn et al. 2000 report, disappointingly, that
despite Executive Order 12866 to the contrary, only 13 percent of the major health,
safety, and environmental regulations from mid-1996 to mid-1999 had as part of the
relevant agency’s regulatory impact analysis both a best estimate and range of costs.)
Another useful measure of the extent to which the Frank and Sunstein approach
might make a difference in policy evaluation comes from examining regulations that
would pass a cutoff of benefits being greater than costs if one applied the Frank and
Sunstein 33 percent add factor to benefits. For the sake of concreteness, let us rely on the
cost per life saved table compiled by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and reported in a book by Justice Stephen Breyer.19 In his book, Breyer summarizes the
cost per life saved for 53 different government policies. Now take the reference point
value of $4 million per statistical life saved, which Frank and Sunstein take as the current
applied government standard when evaluating regulations. So, policies with a cost per life
saved less than $4 million would pass the benefit-cost test, and policies with a cost per
life saved greater than $4 million would fail the benefit-cost test. What if we were to raise
the value of life to $4.7 million, which is the most conservative add factor Frank and
Sunstein discuss? Upping the benefit per statistical life saved by $0.7 million means that
the benefit per life saved for various regulatory policies in the OMB tally jump from $3.4
million per life for the benzene NESHAP regulation (original: fugitive emissions) to $5.7
18

Of course, the estimated average WTP and its associated measure of precision we are discussing might
change if computed from a model that incorporated additional variables representing the social/group
effects that concern Frank and Sunstein. However, we also note that Frank and Sunstein do not consider the
additional complication that because the worker’s or the consumer’s relevant reference group must be
specified ex ante in the statistical model used to include reference group effects, the WTP estimate will be
misleading and imprecise if the researcher’s assumed reference group is wrong. See footnote 16 and
references therein.
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million for the EPA ethylene dibromide drinking water standard. How many more
policies now pass a retrospective benefit-cost test? None.
What if instead we use the most liberally adjusted (for positional effects) estimate
of the value of life Frank and Sunstein consider, $7 million? Two more regulations would
now pass a retrospective benefit-cost test, the EPA ethylene dibromide drinking water
standard and the EPA benzene NESHAP regulation (revised: coke byproducts). No other
regulations in the table of 53 regulatory policies listed by Breyer would become costeffective. Almost doubling the value of life in economic regulatory evaluation as is
currently done would have little effect on the economic desirability of a wide range of
regulatory policies. The basic policy need now is not minor refinements in the value of
life, such as proposed by Frank and Sunstein. More valuable would be greater agency
care in producing cost benefit studies that adhere to currently accepted practices as
discussed and described in Gold et al. (1996) and Hahn et al. (2000) as well as greater
agency adherence to the implications of the estimated benefits and costs when setting
regulatory policy as discussed and described in Sunstein (2000).
Evaluation That Considers Distribution of Outcomes
The issue of evaluating distributional equity in costs and effects of government
intervention is like the old saying about the weather, “Everyone complains about it but
nobody does anything about it.” Just as scientists do not have the technology to change
the weather, empirical researchers have not generally had the statistical tools to do justice
to understanding the distributional consequences of state intervention in behavior while
examining the average overall effect. The good news is that things are changing, and
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elegant statistical techniques have started to appear that produce empirically robust
conclusions about cost and benefit distribution consequences (DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux 1996; Heckman, Smith, and Clements 1997; Heckman and Smith 1998;
Heckman 2001; and DiNardo and Tobias 2001). The bad news is that even the most
transparent of the statistical techniques for understanding distribution issues are still a
long way from being put into widespread use because of their complexity.
As alluring as the Frank and Sunstein attempt to introduce simply the distribution
of outcomes into the typical cost-benefit calculation is, there are good reasons not to do it
their way. Our basic objection to enlarging the benefits side of the typical cost-benefit
analysis based on the concerns of Frank and Sunstein is that there may be countervailing
positional effects stemming from the distribution of the benefit. One’s drive for status
will include a concern with health and the risk of death or disability, not just income. An
additional flaw in the Frank and Sunstein argument is that they do not consider the usual
statistical practice that when judging an estimate of, say, an average, the true mean could
be higher or lower than the sample average. Moreover, boosting value of life measures as
they recommend will have little consequential effect on policy evaluations.
Despite the obvious sensitivity of assigning a value to risks to life, the use of
value of life calculations to value policy benefits has become standard practice
throughout the government. What accounts for this widespread adoption of the method?
In our view the fact that the estimates are based on real market data for life and death
choices rather than hypothetical thought experiments is a major contributing factor.
Moreover, given the sensitivity of the concerns, it is noteworthy that absolute value of
life estimates are derived from the value workers themselves place on risks of death as
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reflected in their labor market decisions. The Frank and Sunstein adjustments are based
on hypothetical experiments and happiness surveys in the Netherlands and elsewhere for
which the link to how people value risks to their life is much less transparent.
Our advocacy of absolute values of life does not imply that there are no remaining
issues to be explored. Among the most glaring informational needs are how we should
value the lives of the elderly, who may have few years of remaining life expectancy, and
children, who have an entire lifetime ahead. Risks to future generations also are difficult
to value. Progress along the age and generational lines of program beneficiaries and
payers will hinge on ascertaining what the accurate risk-money tradeoff is for each group
of interest. Frank and Sunstein seek to complicate policy evaluation with a concern for
how a small decrease in one’s income implicit in purchasing a reduction in risk will
affect one’s position on the economic status treadmill. However, we find no compelling
evidence that the quest for economic status should lead to any adjustment in the value of
life currently used in policy evaluations
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